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Private Industry and the Second Five-Year Plan: 
The Mundhra Episode as Exemplar of 
Capitalist Myopia
Nasir Tyabji
The resignation of T T Krishnamachari from the finance 
ministership in early 1958 was the culmination of three 
developments evolving concurrently. The first was the 
M C Chagla Commission of Enquiry Report, which 
ultimately led to Jawaharlal Nehru accepting 
Krishnamachari’s resignation. The second, the “Mundhra 
episode” was media managed with the encouragement 
of industrial interests who found that the controls 
established as part of the industrialisation drive 
accompanying the Second Five-Year Plan made serious 
and unacceptable inroads in private capitalist 
decision-making. The third development involved social 
engineering, a concerted effort to push the bearers of 
merchant and usurer capital towards industrial capitalist 
norms. This paper, based on contemporary records, 
argues that the more profound reasons for 
Krishnamachari’s fall was the “Rama Rau affair” of late 
1956. It holds that the institutional subordination of the 
Reserve Bank of India was intended to mould monetary 
policy to the requirements of industrial development. It 
concludes that Krishnamachari tripped in attempting to 
coerce street-smart businessmen in control of industry 
to behave like true industrialists.
Nasir Tyabji (ntyabji@gmail.com) is with the Institute for Studies in 
Industrial Development, New Delhi.
In February 1958, musing over just how a situation had arisen by which an outstanding minister, T T Krishnamachari, was likely to be forced to resign over the fallout of the “Mundhra 
episode”, M O Mathai, the special assistant to Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru, had the following explanation to offer.1 In a 
note to Jawaharlal Nehru, Mathai argued that the great jubila-
tion amongst Gujarati businessmen and some Parsi businessmen 
over the situation was basically due to the fi scal policies that 
Krishnamachari had pursued. Continuing, Mathai explained 
that, based on various kinds of information available to him, in-
cluding messages from “decent” businessmen, it was apparent 
that the campaign was the fi rst attack on (Nehruvian) socialism. 
It was, indeed, also an indirect attack on Nehru. Opponents of 
this ideology were openly proclaiming that socialism would dis-
appear with Krishnamachari’s exit. Further, so the argument 
went, as the head of the government, Nehru should also resign. A 
week later, bowing to the inevitable, Mathai pointed out that if 
Krishnamachari had to go, as seemed certain by then, there was 
an uncomfortable fact to be faced: that he had been sacrifi ced for 
implementing policies that he had introduced as a loyal comrade 
of Nehru’s.2 
This paper, based on contemporary records, reaches the 
conclusion that, while this was, indeed, so there was, a more 
viscerally felt reason for the opposition to Krishnamachari. 
This lay in the “Rama Rau episode”. Though less glamorous, 
this drama had led to the resignation of the Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI) governor, B Rama Rau in December 1956 over his 
inability, in his perception, to prevent the infringement by the 
government of the RBI’s autonomy in determining monetary 
policy. Actually, such a perception of events trivialises the 
historical importance of the episode: it was part of a strategy 
to institute an effective industrial policy by subordinating 
monetary policy to the demands of industrial development. 
Further, the paper argues that Krishnamachari tripped in 
attempting, through fi nance ministry stewardship, an ambitious 
programme of social engineering: he tried to force a section 
of the dominant bloc of businessmen, who had acquired control 
of industry, to behave like true industrialists, rather than 
e ngaging in moneylending, speculation in stocks and commodi-
ties, or asset stripping. In this, his political fall from grace pro-
vides an object lesson in political economy: the deadly conse-
quences of misreading the limits to the relative autonomy of 
the state.
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1 Protecting Industry from Predatory Capitalists
In early 1955, at its annual session held at Avadi, near Madras, the 
Indian National Congress passed its resolution declaring its aim 
to take India towards a socialist pattern of society. Even before 
this resolution, it was becoming apparent to British interests op-
erating in the form of managing agencies that the halcyon days 
for their unhindered business activities were not likely to last 
much longer. Although they supported a determined effort to 
retain the managing agency system which ultimately continued 
for the next 15 years, repatriation of capital was clearly a major 
preoccupation (Tyabji 2009).
In the middle of 1954, the Dalmia group attempted to use this 
moment of vulnerability by attempting to buy a substantial block 
of shares in one of the major British managing agencies in Uttar 
Pradesh, the British India Corporation (BIC). Although this effort 
failed, a year later, Haridas Mundhra, who had successfully ob-
tained control of British fi rms in the Calcutta area in the tea in-
dustry and in engineering fi rms such as Jessop and Company, 
also wrested control over BIC. Expressing his anxiety at the 
ability of Mundhra to do as he liked, right under the nose of the 
Government of India, T T Krishnamachari, minister for com-
merce and industry, asked C D Deshmukh, fi nance minister, to 
have procedures examined which would allow the government 
to examine the bona fi des of an acquirer of any large block of 
shares in a company whose capital and other assets were valued 
at Rs 20 lakh or more in then current prices.3
Mundhra’s large-scale acquisitions had reached the stage 
where they had attracted the attention of the United Sates news-
magazine Time. A message, presumably about Mundhra and 
probably intercepted by the revenue intelligence authorities was 
forwarded to Jawaharlal Nehru, who mystifi ed by the then un-
known name, also wrote to C D Deshmukh to ask whether there 
was any material in the fi nance ministry about Mundhra’s ori-
gins.4 Deshmukh’s reply, sent three days later, was full of infor-
mation, and given the importance of Mundhra to later events, is 
worth examining in detail.5 Mundhra was, according to Desh-
mukh’s information, a “self-made man”, though as subsequent 
details show, with a considerable network of support, both in 
Marwari business circles and amongst the tea export traders. 
With fi nances of Rs 50 lakh, each provided by the fi rm of Bansilal 
Abhirchand of Nagpur and Vallabhswami, a Vaishnavite guru 
from Rajasthan, he started with tea exports before the second 
world war, subsequently building up his capital base in Britain by 
retaining both the sales proceeds and profi ts there.6 With this 
collateral, he was able to gain further resources in India, buying 
up not only Jessops, but Richardson and Cruddas, Duncan and 
Stratton, some collieries, the Brahmaputra Tea Company and 
Oslers Electrical concerns. His other acquisitions were the Assam 
Tea Company and BIC. Throughout 1954 and 1955, Mundhra was 
in touch with large shareholders in the Assam Tea Company, and 
the resulting share price fl uctuations were remarked on by the 
British fi nancial press. The existing board of directors, as a defen-
sive measure, had created a large number of shares worth one 
shilling each, with voting rights equivalent to the existing pound 
valued shares. Mundhra had been trying to obtain foreign ex-
change to fi nance the purchase of these shares, but Deshmukh 
claimed that his offi cials had been instructed not to allow foreign 
exchange outgo on this account. 
In the case of BIC, although Mundhra had bought a small 
number of shares, the McRobert Trust owned the controlling 
block and Mundhra had worked hard to persuade the trustees in 
England to sell their holdings to him. The Singhania group, which 
already held a substantial number of shares, was prepared to buy 
Mundhra’s block if he was unable to persuade the McRobert Trust. 
With this, the Singhania’s would have gained control. However, 
Deshmukh wrote, that very day’s edition of the Statesman news-
paper had reported that Mundhra had succeeded in his effort, on 
condition that he, in turn, did not sell off. Mundhra’s own manag-
ing agency, the S B Industrial Development Company Limited, 
managed many of his acquisitions in name, but his main appeal as 
a potential buyer in the British market lay in his preparedness to 
refrain from detailed interference in his managed companies.
Mundhra had extensive support. One large British insurance 
company, at least, was behind his acquisisions. Even with all this 
Deshmukh noted, and with his reputed “phenomenal” luck, he 
could not have succeeded without the knowledge of the British 
Exchange Control Authorities. British Exchange Banks would 
have required a guarantee from their head offi ces in London be-
fore extending loans to him in India and this could not be pro-
vided without approval or acquiescence of the exchange control-
lers. What was clear was that Mundhra had satisfactory arrange-
ments with the exchange banks and large overdrafts against the 
shares he lodged with them.
By the mid-1950s, Mundhra’s wealth was reputed to be about 
Rs 1-1.5 crore. Apart from the Vaishnavite guru, Mundhra was also 
rumoured to have access to the resources commanded by Shanti 
Prasad Jain, chairperson of the Punjab National Bank. He was 
also a “bull” operator both for the shares of companies under his 
control and for those he wished to acquire. He was reputed to have a 
“thoroughly dishonest attitude” and the judge who had disposed 
of one of his appeals concerning income tax matters in 1954 had 
gone so far as to record that, given Mundhra’s past record, he 
would have used his discretion to refuse any writ fi led by him.
From Krishnamachari’s and Deshmukh’s accounts, it appears 
that at least three of the Marwari business groups, Dalmia, Sing-
hania and Mundhra, with the support of a fourth business inter-
est, S P Jain, were vying to gain control of major fi rms involved in 
the tea, textile and engineering industries, in the vacuum created 
by the repatriation of British interests. There were several points 
of concern here. First, whatever the failures of the British manag-
ing agencies, there was a vast difference between their profes-
sionalism and that of the Indian groups who were engaged in 
taking them over.7 In fact, the differential quality of industrial 
management that the British and Indian managing agencies 
represented went beyond any normal range in capabilities. The 
Indian fi rms were either representatives of trading or specula-
tive capital (Mundhra); in the other two cases of Dalmia and 
Singhania, they represented capital accumulated through trade 
and usury, painfully attempting the transition to industrial capital, 
a transition made doubly diffi cult because of the constraints 
placed on industrial investment by the at the end of the colonial 
period of India’s history. 
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The consequences of such a pedigree were well-described by 
Bettelheim.8 Basing his analysis on the RBI conducted All-India 
Rural Credit Survey of 1951, he argued that an overlooked feature 
of the effect of the high rates of return to rural moneylending 
capital was the drain on urban capital stocks. This differential 
was the cause of a continuous drain on newly formed industrial 
capital, taking it not only into fi nancial and commercial operations, 
but into the rural areas. This led to a situation, where capital 
amassed in the industrial process was degraded into an accumu-
lation of debts, an extraordinary transformation of capital into 
income in the hands of landlords and previous debtors.
Even if this fl ow could be reduced (by, for instance, the crea-
tion of the State Bank of India (SBI) with an extended network of 
rural branches), there was the second point of concern for the 
state. This lay in the predilections of these businessmen: rather 
than using their accumulated capital in greenfi eld investments, 
they were engaged in the takeover of existing companies. This 
practice enabled them to evade evolution into industrial capital-
ists. Finally, and perhaps most dangerously, stock market opera-
tions explicitly visible in the case of Mundhra, were driving the 
stock market forward, and encouraging other businessmen simi-
larly to engage their resources in speculation on the markets. 
The entire plan of industrial development which the Second 
Five-Year Plan was to lay out was threatened by these activities of 
private capital. For the 1948 Industrial Policy Resolution, soon to 
be replaced by the more clearly focused resolution of 1956 had laid 
out areas which were open for fresh investment by the private sec-
tor. It was within these bounds that private resources were ex-
pected to be channelled. For the representatives of merchant and 
usury capital, widespread forms of pre-industrial capital, on the 
other hand, textiles, sugar and other light industry were their pre-
ferred area of activity. With capacity in large-scale cotton mills limited 
by the policy measures designed to increase handloom production, 
acquisition of existing fi rms in textiles, tea and engineering, the 
last assured of market demand by planned expansion of public 
sector activity were far more attractive, being known quantities, 
with production processes well-understood and demand assured.
It was these considerations that led T T Krishnamachari to address 
the fi nance minister only a couple of months later, on the inexplicable 
boom in the stock market.9 Curiously, the beginning of the boom 
seems to have coincided with announcement of the “socialist pat-
tern of society”, implying perhaps that the stock market realised 
that private industrial profi ts were going to rise in the foreseeable 
future. However, Krishnamachari was concerned that the degree of 
appreciation in share prices, which was qualitatively of a higher 
order as compared to worldwide trends. Such an increase would 
mean, as earlier mentioned that fewer resources would be available 
to take up shares in new companies fl oated in order to establish 
industrial capacities in areas hitherto untapped. Krishnamachari 
suggested that measures should be explored to channel investments 
into these newer areas, possibly by asking banks through the RBI to 
discontinue lending for investments in shares of existing companies.
It was not only British interests which were contemplating re-
patriating their holdings in India. In a letter to T T Krishnamachari, 
G D Birla explained the mysterious circumstances by which he 
was approached by “quite an important” man, who, coming 
straight to the point, wished to know whether Birla would be in-
terested in buying out Neville Wadia’s holdings in Bombay Dyeing, 
the major textile mill in Bombay.10 The deal was to include the 
managing agency which would be transferred to the Birla group. 
From the trend of Birla’s letter, it appeared that he was expected 
to show an interest and name a suitably infl ated price, which 
would then be used to bargain with the Calcutta or Ahmedabad 
buyers, who were reputed to have offered double the then 
Bombay Dyeing share price of Rs 500. Birla reportedly advised the 
intermediary that if the Ahmedabad offer came from Kasturbhai 
Lalbhai, that should be accepted as this offered the prospect of 
far better management than would be provided by the Calcutta 
aspirers. Birla ended his letter by saying that he felt sorry at the 
prospect of industrialists selling off their interests. Birla men-
tioned Haridas Mundhra, Chiranjilal Bajoria and Shanti Prasad 
Jain as likely buyers, who would pay a “fancy” price but who 
were not, presumably in his estimation, industrialists. He also re-
ported the perhaps politically correct statement at the age of 62, 
he had no desire to enter into a new business but wished only to 
create employment opportunities and wealth, neither of which 
aims could be realised by buying an existing company. This, then 
was the defi ning element of an industrialist, at least in that early 
period of industrial development in India.
Foremost amongst the capitalists whose outlook did not accord 
with those of industrialists were the jute mill owners of Bengal. 
T T Krishnamachari had remarked, nearly three years earlier on 
the Marwaris’ “…notorious indifference to the effi cient working 
of the industrial apparatus, both mechanical and human”. This 
was in one of the earliest expressions of concern about the con-
sequences of British interests selling out to the Marwaris. This 
was a colourful, yet acute portrayal of the attitudes of representa-
tives of merchant and usurer capital to issues of industrial man-
agement, plant maintenance and modern systems of industrial 
relations. As Nehru noted, even B C Roy, chief minister of West 
Bengal, and no “socialist” ideologue, had spoken rather strongly 
about the jute mill employers and felt that steps should be taken to 
make them behave.11 This was presumably a reference to their 
cavalier attitude, along the lines of absentee agrarian landlords, 
towards laws regulating labour conditions in their plants.
To summarise the situation as it appeared to the Government 
of India at the beginning of the Second Five-Year Plan. Business-
men who had accumulated large funds through grey areas of 
economic activity had found that the stock market, buoyed by the 
prospects of high returns to industrial investment, was a source 
of high short-term returns. Simultaneously, established British 
and even some Indian industrialists, whether motivated by 
fatigue or uncertain prospects within a controlled economy were 
keen to liquidate their stock market based assets. There was then 
the prospect that well-established and well-managed fi rms 
would fall into the hands of unknown fi gures, some of whom had 
the reputation of being adventurers.12 Apart from their own pro-
clivities on the stock exchange, their manipulation of the market 
through insider trading was proving a lure to other capitals which 
might have been invested in new enterprises. With ambitious 
plans for private investment, the Government of India could not 
be indifferent to these phenomena.
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2 Social Engineering through Fiscal Policy
Even before he became fi nance minister in September 1956, 
Krishnamachari was playing an important role in introducing 
innovative ideas into Indian fi scal policy. After a meeting with 
Nicholas Kaldor in March 1956, he wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru 
that he agreed with Kaldor that the existing taxation system took 
no account of human factors and presumed that by increasing 
the rate of tax, the desired redistribution would take place.13 He 
emphasised also that Kaldor’s proposals, with which he was 
familiar, having read his book on expenditure tax and his minute 
of dissent to the British Royal Commission on Taxation, formed 
parts of an integrated scheme and could not be introduced piece-
meal. However, given the novelty of the scheme, Krishnamachari 
felt that considerable propaganda efforts would be necessary, 
both with members of Parliament (MPs) and within the Congress. 
He asked Nehru if he was agreeable to have a meeting in the Lok 
Sabha, to which Nehru agreed.14
Two months later, when a group of Congress MPs submitted 
a memorandum on taxation policy, a copy was sent to Krishna-
machari.15 The substance of their argument was that with the 
adoption of the “socialist pattern of society” (by both the Congress 
and the Lok Sabha), the recommendations of the Taxation Enquiry 
Commission had been made obsolete. So the proposal to tax basic 
items of consumption in use by the poor, so as to raise resources for 
the Plan, was not valid. The group demanded that a list of items 
which they indicated should not be taxed, but measures taken to 
ensure stable prices prevailed despite resort to measures of defi cit 
fi nance. For this, not only price controls, but a system of buffer 
stocks in strategic locations had to be established. The resources 
foregone because of the exemptions on tax of these basic items 
could be balanced by increasing taxation levels of the higher 
income groups, whose income and wealth would necessarily 
increase with a “high pressure development programme”.
Concerned by the implications of these trends in economic 
ideology, the World Bank took the opportunity of Krishnamachari’s 
formal appointment as fi nance minister to deliver a few home 
truths.16 Emphasising that it was his conviction that India’s interest 
lay in giving private enterprise, both Indian and foreign, every en-
couragement, Eugene Black, president of the Bank, disparaged the 
intrusion of ideology in policy matters. He singled out the Indus-
trial Policy Resolution in this regard, and argued that the targets 
for public sector investment were far too large. The defi cit fi nanc-
ing necessary to support this investment were sure to lead to unac-
ceptable infl ationary pressures, and create fi nancial instability. As 
far as external fi nances were concerned, the Bank wanted a change 
from the existing policies that discouraged exports of textiles and 
vegetable oils, to the active support of these and other traditional 
exports.17 Reiterating the Bank’s willingness to support India’s 
Plan, Black cautioned that the quantum of aid would necessarily 
depend on India’s success in attracting foreign investment 
(phrased as “… external fi nancial assistance… (which did not en-
tail)…fi xed foreign exchange commitments”). A specifi c area of 
policy reform, with which the letter ended, noted that Indian reli-
ance on the expansion of the rail network, while welcome, should 
not ignore the importance of road and coastal shipping, a problem 
of transport “…which has particularly engaged the attention of the 
Bank, as well as of your own Government and of private interests 
throughout India”. 
The impact of this letter was evident a short time later, when 
the cabinet met to consider the subject of the fi nancial resources 
required for the Second Five-Year Plan.18 The terse minutes merely 
recorded that after consideration of a fi nance ministry paper on 
the subject, there was a broad agreement on the approach. How-
ever, it was decided that for the time being only the three propos-
als for a capital gains tax, an increase on tax rates on dividends, 
and controls on companies’ reserves were to be implemented. 
This was certainly a retreat from Kaldor’s integrated scheme. 
However, the signifi cance of the controls on the use of reserves 
by companies needs to be emphasised. From the 1930s, observers 
had noted the tendency of managing agencies to use these re-
serves as cheap sources of fi nance for a variety of purposes, with 
the concomitant that depreciation reserves were perpetually in-
adequate to meet replacement costs, particularly at times of tech-
nological change, or even of unusual levels of infl ation.19 Ensur-
ing that reserves not intended to be utilised for upgradation of 
plant and equipment would not be eligible for tax rebate was an 
important step in social engineering, discouraging non-industrial 
forms of utilisation of company resources.
Another controversy that erupted at this time was that created 
by the resignation of the RBI governor, B Rama Rau.20 The substan-
tive issue was the government’s proposal to increase the stamp 
duty levied on money market transactions. The RBI felt that the 
large increase in stamp duty, a “fi scal measure with monetary im-
plications” in Krishnamachari’s words, infringed on the prerogative 
of the bank to determine monetary policy. Apart from the govern-
ment’s action, Rama Rau was also incensed at the characterisation 
of the bank as a department of the government and offended at 
Krishnamachari’s personal behaviour with him. Nehru supported 
Krishnamachari, and various commentators have noted and gener-
ally deplored the era of subordination of the RBI to the government 
that this episode inaugurated. What has not been remarked on is 
the fact that this institutional subordination was the expression of 
the primacy given to industrial policy over monetary policy.21 As a 
measure of social engineering, this was even more critical than the 
controls on reserves. Basing himself on the empirical results of the 
RBI’s All India Rural Credit Survey, Bettelheim had remarked on the 
large difference between the interest rates in the urban money 
markets and those in rural moneylending (the bank rate rose to a 
maximum of about 5% in 1958 as compared to agricultural money-
lending rates of between 25% in Bihar and 40% and above in 
Bengal, Orissa and Himachal).22 The tightness of the money 
market and requests for steps to ease controls were one, constantly 
repeated, theme in all of G D Birla’s correspondence with 
Krishnamachari.23 Shrewdly, he linked the market conditions affected 
to the diffi culties it created in fi nancing industrial expansion plans.24 
3 The Mundhra Episode
The resignation of T T Krishnamachari from the fi nance minister-
ship in early 1958 was the culmination of three developments, evolv-
ing concurrently, but distinct in their historical signifi cance. The 
fi rst was the actual sequence of events that led to Jawaharlal Nehru 
accepting Krishnamachari’s resignation. This has been detailed in 
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the public record, in the open proceedings of the M C Chagla Com-
mission of Enquiry and notably, in G Balachandran’s account in the 
volume of the history of the RBI authored by him.25 The second, lit-
tle noticed, is the way in which the “Mundhra episode” was media 
managed with the encouragement, if not at the behest, of indus-
trial interests who found that the controls established as part of the 
industrialisation drive accompanying the Second Five-Year Plan 
made serious and unacceptable inroads in private capitalist deci-
sion-making. These were felt to be of an order that justifi ed, in 
their minds, a multi-pronged political response, as will be seen. 
The third development, involved social engineering, a concerted 
effort to push the bearers of merchant and usurer capital towards 
industrial capital norms. It will be argued that it was an uneasy 
coalition formed by opponents of each of these developments that 
coalesced and led to Krishnamachari’s resignation.
In May 1957, as large quantities of shares of the Mundhra fi rms 
were held by commercial banks in the country, including SBI and 
several exchange banks, H V R Iengar, governor of the Reserve Bank 
had convened a meeting to take concerted action to prevent a sudden 
or haphazard unloading of these shares on the market.26 However, 
this meeting was abortive and by June 1957, Mundhra was in 
serious trouble. He had approached G D Birla for help in liquidating a 
part of his holdings, but Birla felt that with the tight conditions in 
the money market, no one would be prepared to buy the shares. 
Birla suggested that Mundhra should meet Krishnamachari and 
ask for his advice.27 By this time, the Punjab National Bank, which 
had been accommodating Mundhra, was pressing him to repay and 
Birla felt that Mundhra risked losing control of Turner Morrison. 
Following a further meeting between the SBI, Life Insurance 
Corporation (LIC) and T T Krishnamachari in June, it was decided 
that LIC would attempt to reduce the pressure of the market by 
buying a large block of Mundhra’s shares. The proposal was con-
ceived as a short-term measure to maintain share prices in the 
market, but this step proved incapable of restoring confi dence in 
the share market.28 
Later in the year, SBI and LIC, both with very heavy stakes in 
the matter had reviewed the situation and in consultation with 
Krishnamachari, had agreed that SBI should take urgent action.29 
In November 1957, it was the turn of Iengar to report to 
Krishnamachari. The managing director of BIC was reported to 
have confi ded to Sachin Chaudhuri, who was a member of the 
State Bank of India’s Calcutta local board at that time, that in 
payment for dues from Mundhra’s mills, BIC had received Rich-
ardson and Cruddas shares. These shares had been supposedly 
held by the Punjab National Bank which had sold them. However, 
confi dential enquiries with the bank showed that the endorsement 
for transfer had been forged; the shares neither belonged to the 
bank nor had they transferred them. The BIC managing director 
had lodged the shares in safe custody and Mundhra was demand-
ing that they be returned. Although both the State Bank and the 
LIC were taking steps to ensure the security of their advances and 
investments in Mundhra’s various fi rms, Iengar felt that the time 
had certainly come to stop Mundhra in his share certifi cate forg-
ing orgy.30 Iengar followed with another letter, two days later in-
forming Krishnamachari that the Managing Director of BIC had 
also lodged the share transaction form with the SBI, with an RBI 
lock installed for double protection. In the meantime, a large 
block of Mundhra’s shares pledged to the Punjab National Bank 
were offered for sale, because Mundhra had not been able to pay 
his dues and his cheques were not being honoured. It was uncer-
tain how many of these shares were forged.31 
Events moved quickly after this. On 5 December, Iengar wrote 
to say that LIC and SBI would jointly present a petition asking the 
court to appoint a manager for Richardson and Cruddas and BIC, 
which were to be taken possession of under the hypothecation 
agreement they had entered into.32 A criminal case was to be 
fi led concerning the forged shares in the possession of the Punjab 
National Bank. Finally, an investigation under the Company’s Act 
was to be initiated into the affairs of all the Mundhra companies. 
In his secret note, D L Mazumdar, then secretary, Department of 
Company Affairs added that LIC was also keen to change the 
management of Jessop and Company and was seeking the coop-
eration of other large shareholders, Punjab National Bank and 
the engineering fi rm, Burn, Brathwaite, Jessop and Co.33 If this 
cooperation did not materialise, LIC wished to take action under the 
Companies Act with its 20% shareholding, but it was felt that no 
minority shareholder could bring about a quick and non-disruptive 
change in management. Mazumdar also reported that he was in-
formed that at the time when LIC came to Mundhra’s help in June 
1957, no special powers of intervention had been sought from 
Mundhra, so that if the situation did not improve, LIC could deci-
sively intervene in company management. In the event, before the 
Mundhra case became a cause célèbre, the Department of Com-
pany Law, SBI, LIC and RBI had agreed on the takeover through 
court action of the management of BIC and Richardson and Cruddas, 
police action against the share forgeries, and an investigation 
into the affairs of the Mundhra companies by the department.34
In the context of the controversy over the LIC purchase of the 
Mundhra shares, whether the shares should have been bought 
from Mundhra himself, whether Krishnamachari, or H M Patel 
browbeat the chairperson and managing director of LIC to buy 
these shares against their better judgment, the most critical fac-
tor seems to have fallen by the wayside. This was emphasised by 
a comparison of the two notes written by D L Mazumdar,the sec-
retary of the Department of Company Law Administration in 
September 1957 and the second in December 1957. The fi rst was 
addressed to Jawaharlal Nehru, at a time when Krishnamachari 
was in the United States.35 Pointing out that the share purchases 
by LIC seemed not to have had any lasting results, the share prices 
continuing to fall, Mazumdar suggested two options before the 
government. The fi rst was an investigation into the affairs of the 
Mundhra Group under provisions of the Companies Act; the second 
was an action against the management of specifi c companies of 
the group for contravention of articles defi ning sound principles 
of corporate governance. Mazumdar suggested that any process 
of formal investigation would be long drawn out, subject to judi-
cial scrutiny and be detrimental not only to the “…interests of 
investors, but also of employees, and indeed, of production as 
such”. As for action against specifi c companies, the department 
was considering a feasible action.
Curiously, the note did not suggest the takeover of at least 
those companies in the group in which the SBI had a decisive 
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stake through the hypothecation agreements accompanying the 
loans advanced to both BIC and Richardson and Cruddas, a step 
that was taken fi nally, three months later. Similarly, the provi-
sions under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 
(IDRA Act), allowing action by the government in the public inter-
est were not considered at any time. According to Mazumdar, it 
was the evidence of Mundhra’s widespread use of forged share 
certifi cates which made the governor of the RBI feel that urgent 
action was demanded. It was also the combined resolve of the 
RBI, SBI and LIC that led to the agreement by Krishnamachari in 
late November of these initiatives to gain managerial control.
What is being suggested is that in a long-term historical perspec-
tive, the issues that gained public attention at the time of the 
Mundhra episode were irrelevant. The question that needs to be 
asked is why these steps could not have been taken earlier. The 
conventional reasons offered, both by the Commissions of Enquiry, 
and later commentators, of a short-term nexus between Mundhra 
as an individual and the Congress Party’s requirements of funds for 
the 1957 elections seem inadequate.36 As has been mentioned, 
Mundhra had long-standing connections with the British exchange 
banks and even with the British government. The signifi cance of the 
reluctance of Mundhra’s creditor banks to take a combined action 
to protect their own interests at a meeting called by the RBI gover-
nor in May 1957 has already been noted. There was marked reluc-
tance of the Punjab National Bank, which together with the LIC, was 
a major shareholder in BIC to initiate police action, even when it 
was discovered that the share certifi cates it held as surety were 
forgeries. It will be recalled that the chairperson of the bank was 
Shanti Prasad Jain, one of the persons under scrutiny in the Dalmia 
Jain case. It was suggested that the action to divest Mundhra of 
control of his companies until a stage was reached where action 
became imperative was actively discouraged because Mundhra be-
longed precisely to the category of short horizon businessmen, 
who were so entrenched in the political economic nexus that pre-
sided over at least a signifi cant part of the Indian political economy. 
If this was indeed so, then a more promising area of enquiry 
was raised by the brief mention in the Salivati Newsletter, a broad-
sheet published from Bombay and evidently in the know of Bom-
bay share market gossip.37 According to this account, in March 1957, 
the union commerce minister was alerted by the chief minister of 
Uttar Pradesh to the accumulation of stocks at the BIC mills and the 
imminent threat of closure of the mills leading to unemployment for 
20,000 workers. After a visit to Lucknow and discussions with the 
chief minister and Mundhra, the union government offi cials ad-
vised Mundhra to reduce the labour force by dismissing a section 
of workers. He was also offered fi nancial help, but after the refusal 
of the National Industrial Development Corporation, the SBI and 
the exchange banks to advance further funds, attention was to focus 
on LIC. According to the Salivati Newsletter’s sources, between 
four and six members of the union cabinet were in favour of 
fi nancial help to Mundhra, and quite contrary to the predominant 
view that the fi nancial improprieties were the result of a series of 
ill-considered and unsound directives issued by Krishnamachari, it 
was held that actually he was guilty of an inability to withstand 
the pressure from his cabinet colleagues and was merely an instru-
ment in the decision to purchase the shares by LIC.38
4 The Forum for Free Enterprise and the Democratic 
Research Service
Almost simultaneously with the adoption of the resolution on the 
socialist pattern of society in January 1955, and its endorsement 
by the Lok Sabha soon afterwards, Bombay businessmen began 
to voice their dissatisfaction with the trend in economic policies. 
As a result, the government agreed to a series of consultations 
with major fi gures in the industrial fi eld. In 1955, the major con-
cern was the Companies Act, and a meeting was held with the 
Congress president, U N Debar, Morarji Desai, the chief minister of 
Bombay State and G D Birla, J R D Tata, Gujarmal Modi amongst 
others. The discussion began generally on the socialist pattern. 
While both Tata and Modi were very gloomy and felt that the fu-
ture held out little hope, Birla and some others took the line that 
adaptation to changing conditions and acceptance of major policies 
laid down by the government was essential if private industry 
was to function properly. Ultimately, both Tata and Modi though 
probably not wholly convinced, toned down their criticism.39 
By February 1956, with the imminent announcement of the 
new Industrial Policy Resolution, the feelings of apprehension 
were quite apparent to G D Birla, who reported the mood at a 
lunch hosted by Tata. Birla’s attempt to inject some optimism ap-
parently entirely failed.40 Led by the Tata Group, these misgivings 
materialised in the Forum for Free Enterprise.41 According to its 
manifesto which was published in the Bombay edition of the 
Times of India in July 1956, the forum was to be a non-political 
and non-partisan organisation, disseminating authoritative in-
formation to educate public opinion on the achievements of pri-
vate enterprise, and the manner in which it could contribute to 
the economic development of the country.42 It called for support 
from those in service, profession, agriculture, trade and industry. 
However, in its far-fl ung effort to explain the purpose of its estab-
lishment, A D Shroff, one of its chief organisers, clarifi ed that the 
forum would have its political activity in the shape of organising 
public opinion against the government’s economic policy, includ-
ing the threat of nationalisation implicit in the takeover of the 
airlines, the imperial bank, and life insurance. The 1956 Industrial 
Policy Resolution was responsible for creating apprehensions in 
businessmen’s minds, as also in the broad investing public.43 
M R Masani, founder of the Democratic Research Service, spoke 
more explicitly at Bangalore: lovers of freedom, he said, should 
be alert enough to shift their fi re and their aim from one source of 
the centralisation of power and privilege to another.44 In his 
opinion, the social forces represented by industrial management, 
trade, organised labour, the professions, industrial proprietors 
and religion could provide the checks and balances necessary to 
curb power. Morarji Vaidya, president of the Indian Merchants 
Chamber, in an article in the Times of India criticised both nation-
alisations, but extended the basis for opposition by referring to 
the “attitude” adopted by the State Trading Organisation.45 Fur-
ther activity was reported with 120 trade organisations in Bom-
bay contacted in the course of fi ve meetings in July 1956, 50 MPs 
in Delhi in September 1956, members of Mysore Chamber of 
Commerce and the Indian Institute of Culture at Bangalore, also 
in September.46 Meetings in Calcutta were held with “prominent 
citizens, with the Upper India Chamber of Commerce in Kanpur, 
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and the Gujarat Chamber of Commerce in Ahmedabad, Finally, 
an All-India Essay contest was organised for students on the 
subject “Free Enterprise and Economic Progress”, and, under the 
auspices of TREND magazine, a meeting for women was held at 
the Taj Mahal hotel, where the audience was reminded that as 
consumers of domestic goods, they provided adequate regulation 
of the industry, thereby making state regulation superfl uous. 
So as to make the aim of the forum plain beyond any doubt, 
according to another intelligence report, A D Shroff, speaking to 
the Commerce Graduates Association in October 1956, referred 
to the letter from Eugene Black, to T T Krishnamachari, criticis-
ing the direction of his economic policy. Black was, according to 
Shroff, a “real and sincere” friend of India. By December 1956, 
the ambitions of the sponsors of the forum, perhaps fortifi ed by 
the response to their campaign, had extended to the overtly 
political. Japan Singh, an MP of the Jharkhand Party was ap-
proached to gain his support for the candidatures of M R Masani, 
A D Shroff, H P Mody and Leslie Sawhney, J R D Tata’s brother-in-
law, in the 1957 parliamentary elections from the Jharkhand area 
of Bihar.47 Tulsidas Kilachand, another industrialist-MP, had 
joined the “Tata crowd” who were simultaneously in touch with 
N C Chatterjee, extending support to 15 candidates in constituen-
cies where the Hindu Mahasabha and Jan Sangh had a political 
base. The Democratic Research Forum and the Forum for Free 
Enterprise, having collected Rs 10 lakh, were in need of more 
money. A political attaché in the US Embassy, “…working directly 
under the orders of Mr Allen Dulles…” [CIA Director] had offered 
considerable fi nancial assistance from secret service funds.48
Apart from the broader relevance of these developments to 
India’s political trajectory, and the increasing pressures towards 
modifying economic strategy, by April 1957, it was clear that the 
immediate target of attack was T T Krishnamachari. H V R Iengar 
informed Krishnamachari of a conversation he had with Shroff.49 
To a query about whether Shroff was aware that he was doing a 
great deal of injury by the reckless manner in which he was at-
tacking the government, he immediately turned the conversation 
towards Krishnamachari personally, and to his supposed open 
hostility even to any legitimate criticism of his policies. While 
reiterating that Shroff’s idiosyncracies were well known to 
Krishnamachari, Iengar warned that the broader intent of 
Shroff’s criticism was being shared with some of his colleagues in 
the cabinet. This aspect of Shroff, of allowing bitterness towards 
policies affecting him in relation to unrelated areas of govern-
ment’s functioning was noted by Nehru, too.50
5 ‘Right Reaction’: Krishnamachari’s Exit and Re-entry 
After the presentation of the 1957 budget, it seemed as if the cam-
paign to create a fear psychosis amongst the middle class had 
reached such proportions that Nehru, while strongly reiterating his 
support for the fi scal measures, had to warn Krishnamachari 
of the prevailing current of opinion.51 Almost simultaneously, 
Krishnamachari was told by the old established Congressman and 
the governor of Bombay State, Sri Prakasa, of his own misgivings 
about the budget proposals.52 Sri Prakasa specifi cally pointed to 
the opportunities for harassment, not only directed at businessmen, 
but also to the middle class who would, reportedly, be required to 
maintain records of expenditure. In the fortnightly report that 
state governors were to send to the president, Sri Prakasa elabo-
rated his concerns, a copy of which he sent to Krishnamachari. On 
his part, pointing out that it was the business of government to 
carry every shade of opinion without sacrifi cing its principles, 
Nehru emphasised the need when a policy opposed any sectional 
interest, to “…hurt him as little as possible, that is, to put it at the 
lowest in a politician’s way.” Not only had the Congress Party in 
the Lok Sabha to be taken along in support of these measures, but 
the people generally. “Running down” of the propertied classes, 
though often justifi ed, ended in not only demoralising them, but 
also the large middle class and even the lower middle class. 
In replying to Nehru’s letter of warning about the currents of 
opposition created by the 1957 budget, Krishnamachari made an 
astute point.53 While agreeing that all the major moulders of pub-
lic opinion in the press were sharply critical of the fi scal measures 
proposed, Birla was singled out as a friend. But even “…he feels hurt 
because the prospect of running the type of business as he has 
been doing in the past will not be possible in the future”. While Birla 
could adjust to the new circumstances, other businessmen, 
presumably deeply enmeshed in the usurious, speculative and 
commercial modes of operation could not easily do so. According 
to Krishnamachari, Birla was thus torn between his loyalty to the 
Congress (his friends) and to his “clan”, this latter breed of business-
men. It was this breed of businessmen whose fi nancial manipulations 
were investigated by the Vivian Bose Commission (India 1963).
These were no ordinary businessmen. Amongst them were 
groups whose trajectory was graphically described by D R Gadgil 
in his comment on the report of the Bose Commission: 
The problem posed by the fi ndings of the Commission may be de-
scribed as follows. It has been found that a group of businessmen has 
acted together in the past, in all kinds of devious, patently unfair or 
even illegal ways, and has, as a result, not only made large gains for its 
members, but has enabled them to attain to such dominant economic 
position that a part of the old group, as such, and most of its members 
individually, today are amongst the most powerful and prosperous of 
business concerns and businessmen in India.54
Where Krishnamachari’s shrewdness seems to have failed 
him was in his unwittingly creating an alliance between Birla’s 
“clan” and the modern Bombay-based supporters of the Forum 
for Free Enterprise. While the former reacted to his measures of 
social engineering, the latter objected to the institution of con-
trols that, in their opinion, impinged on their sources of authority 
and power. Together, they created the situation that forced 
Krishnamachari’s exit from the cabinet.
After the 1962 elections, Nehru offered a re-elected Krishnama-
chari any cabinet post of his choice except fi nance (held by 
Morarji Desai after a brief interval following Krishnamachari’s 
resignation in 1958). In a bitter letter to Nehru, Krishnamachari 
claimed that it was Morarji Desai who had played a major role in 
ensuring a situation in which his resignation became inevitable. 
His charges were formidable:55
…you are a mature politician and the Prime Minister of a great country. 
In the course of the discharge of your obligations, therefore, it does 
happen that you might have to walk over the corpses of your friends. I 
realise it might be necessary and I, for my part, have no grievance. But I 
cannot be a good friend and unilateral though it might be I consider 
myself to be one …., if I did not tell you that you do wrong. It is for you to 
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decide whom you are keeping as helmsman of the economic affairs of 
this country. You will appreciate also that I cannot serve in any ministry 
charged with some economic mission with the present FM as economic 
director. There are two angles to it – one personal and the other a matter 
of principle. Mr M[orarji] D[esai] had a fair share in the launching of the 
campaign against me when I was F[inance] M[inister]. I know more of it 
after I left. His minions in the Lok Sabha and outside did the dirty work. 
You knew that he brought Moulana [Abul Kalam Azad] into it at one stage. 
He suborned the loyalty of offi cials whom I had trusted and even specially 
favoured by offers of preferment and made them give false testimony 
before the [fi rst Vivian] Bose Commission. His agent [,] a journalist at the 
time [,] lobbied with the UPSC (Union Public Service Commission) and 
got rewarded as news editor in A[ll] I[ndia] R[adio]. The nasty speeches 
in the discussion on Bose’s report, etc, were made by his agents – known 
to be such to all members of the Lok Sabha. On the public issues he was 
the apostle [of] all that I was against. The Finance Ministry has become a 
veritable paradise of the vested interests these last few years. My tax 
measures were drastically amended and such that remain have been made 
dead letters administratively…I hear that the Central Board of Revenue 
has been asked to prepare a paper supporting a scheme to abolish the 
wealth tax and expenditure tax. Tax evasion during these four years has 
gathered momentum and offi cers are afraid of Bombay vested inter-
ests…The Swatantra Party against which you have been fi ghting is not 
really led by Rajaji [C Rajagopalachari] but by the big guns of industry and 
trade and the F M and another in your cabinet are their fi rm supporters. 
At the appropriate time they would change the band wagon….
When the report on the Dalmia Jain Group was released in 
1963, its quite startling revelations gave pause to even those 
members of the government, long inured to the ways of the busi-
ness world. Its implications were such that Krishnamachari, 
fi nally back in the cabinet, felt that a carefully chosen offi cial 
would need to be appointed to examine the report and suggest 
remedies. He feared that the forces which would oppose action 
were so powerful and resourceful that nothing might conceivably 
be done at all.56 D R Gadgil, in an unsigned note in response to a 
request from Pitamber Pant, Head of the Perspective Planning 
Division of the Planning Commission, set out in clear terms the 
reasons why the controls instituted by the government had failed 
to deal with determined efforts to prevent activities which though 
not technically illegal, had serious implications for society.57
Discussing the possible ways of preventing similar occurrences 
in the future, Gadgil argued that the two principal legislative 
enactments, the IDRA and the Companies Act, were inadequate to 
deal with such situations. IDRA was framed so as to promote 
industrial development, to maintain continuity and effi ciency in 
production, and to conservation of resources. Only one subsection, 
added in 1953, enabled the government to initiate an investigation 
when any enterprise was seen to be managed in a manner highly 
detrimental to the industry as a whole, or to the public interest. 
However, Gadgil noted, the addition of this sub-clause had not 
made any difference to the rest of the act: public interest 
remained a fi fth wheel in the structure of the act.58 In the case of 
the Companies Act, Gadgil pointed out that following the example 
of British Company Law, the Indian Act abstracted from economic 
policy, and more critically, the courts in India had examined 
proposals for corporate action that came before them in a narrow 
framework, and public interest again was entirely absent in their 
consideration of a case.59 Turning to international experience in 
dealing with economic offenses of the Dalmia Jain type, Gadgil 
pointed out that only in post-war West German legislation did 
offences include those which “…violat[ed] the interest of the 
State in the conservation and integrity of the economic order as a 
whole or in individual branches”. Moreover, he added, in relation 
to this new classifi cation of economic offence, the measurement 
of the gravity of the offence was also innovative: the yardstick 
was not only the gravity of the interest that had been injured, but 
also the mens rea (degree of criminal intent) of the offender.
Gadgil concluded that action that was to be taken was not at all 
a matter for the lawyer. Only when public interest was invoked 
and the approach defi ned as that relating to the totality of the 
economic system that a solution would be possible to halt, if not 
reverse, a “steadily worsening situation”. Concretely he sug-
gested that, the group’s managing agency control over public 
companies should be forcefully broken, there should be an expro-
priation of the assets of the group, and the fi rms under their con-
trol should be taken over by the government. Finally, the persons 
indicted were to be prohibited from holding offi ce in any joint 
stock company whether closely or widely held.60
Although, largely as a result of the outrage provoked in the Lok 
Sabha by the revelations of the Commission’s report, the manag-
ing agency system was abolished effectively from 1969, there 
was never a return to the range of social engineering policies that 
Krishnamachari had introduced in the 1957 budget.61 The strategy 
seemed now to curtail businessmen’s proclivities in the fi nancial 
sector (for instance, by nationalising channels of delivery of 
funds for agriculture through takeovers of commercial banks), 
rather than the explicit measures that had cost Krishnamachari 
the fi nance minister’s post in the earlier government.62
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T T Krishnamachari TTK papers. correspondence 
with G D Birla, pp 36-37.
 41 A D Shroff’s presentation reported in “Minutes of 
the Meeting of the Departmental Heads of Tata 
Companies convened by the chairman on the 
23 April 1957” TTK papers Subject File 10, pp 13-15.
 42 Top Secret note “Forum of Free Enterprise” undated 
JN papers File 485, p 97a.
 43 A D Shroff’s speeches in Calcutta to a group of 
businessmen, September 1956, and in Bombay to the 
Commerce Graduates Association in October 
1956. Ibid: 97a.
 44 Ibid.
 45 Ibid: 96.
 46 Secret note “A note on the ‘Forum of Free Enter-
prise’ ” no date JN Papers File 492, pp 34-39.
 47 It is interesting to note that it was G D Birla who 
suggested to H P Mody, in February 1956, that if 
he wished to contest the Lok Sabha election, he 
should stand from an area near Jamshedpur, rather 
than from Bombay. Personal letter from G D Birla 
28 February 1956 to T T Krishnamachari TTK 
papers correspondence with G D Birla, p 36.
 48 Personal note by M O Mathai 1 December 1956 JN 
papers File 493, p 29. Nehru sent the substance of 
this note to U N Dhebar, Congress president, in his 
secret letter No 676-PMO/56 6 December 1956 
File 494, p 121. In a secret note to the secretary 
general of the Ministry of External Affairs written 
on the same day (to which, signifi cantly, he at-
tached a copy of Mathai’s note), he suggested that 
at the impending talks with the US Government 
“...some general reference might be made to these 
reports of American funds being offered for elec-
tion purposes here.” File 494: 103.
 49 Strictly personal letter 4 April 1957 TTK papers 
correspondence with HVR Iengar, p 10.
 50 Secret letter No 585-PMH/59 11 March 1959 to 
Fazl Ali, governor of Assam JN papers File 676,  p 257.
 51 Secret and personal letter No 1357-PMH/57 2 Au-
gust 1957 JN papers File 543, pp 137-38.
 52 Secret and personal letter 1 June 1957 TTK papers 
correspondence with Jawaharlal Nehru 1957, 
pp 80-87.
 53 Nehru’s secret and personal letter No 1357-PMH/57 
2 August 1957 JN papers File 543, pp 137-38. 
Krishnamachari’s secret letter No 344/FM/57 
3 August 1957 JN papers File 543, pp 192-94.
 54 Gadgil note p 3 TTK Papers correspondence with 
Jawaharlal Nehru 1963, pp 60-64. Also JN Papers 
File 743, pp 277-81. 
 55 Hand written letter 24 March 1962 TTK papers cor-
respondence with Jawaharlal Nehru 1962, pp 11-14.
 56 Letter No 49/MEDC/63 28 January 1963 to Jawa-
harlal Nehru TTK papers correspondence with 
Jawaharlal Nehru 1963-64, p 22.
 57 Gadgil note, p 1 letter 736/-PMH/63 19 March 
1963 from Jawaharlal Nehru to Pitamber Pant 
acknowledges that the note came from him.
 58 Gadgil note, p 2.
 59 Gadgil note, p 1.
 60 Gadgil note, pp 3-4.
 61 Shirokov (1973) whose close reading of contem-
porary material is evidenced by his bibliography, 
notes that the 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution 
was forced through by “middle ranking” sections 
of capitalists. However, the further development 
of capitalist industrialisation marked the end of 
“bourgeois radicalism” (p 59).
 62 Interestingly, the report which is generally held to 
be the basis of the decision to nationalise the pri-
vate commercial banks in 1969, mentions the ad-
vantages that nationalisation would provide in 
curbing fl ows from the banking system to the un-
organised money market (cf Bettelheim’s com-
ments mentioned earlier). See Congress Parlia-
mentary Party (1967), pp 65-66.
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